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SOVIET UNION  1. Comment on Zorin's appointment to United Nations:  The appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin as chief of the Soviet Un delegation signifies little or no change in the Kremlin's policies. Zorin's experience has been in Eastern European and UN affairs. His reported connection with the Soviet state security apparatus suggests that he will have responsibilities beyond his UN functions.  Other recent shifts of ambassadors have been in line with an established policy not to leave Soviet diplomats too long in the same Western posts and have not been accompanied by significant alterations of Soviet foreign policies.	Declassified .	in Par	t - Sanitize	ed Copy Ap	proved for I	Release 20	)13/12/03 :	CIA-RDP79	Г00975A000800350	0001-7 50 <b>X</b> 1
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4.	Comment on dissolution of Japanese Diet:
•	The sudden decision of Prime Minister Yoshida to dissolve the Japanese Diet represents a concession to growing pressure from within his own party for early general elections. Although designed primarily to enhance the party's position, the decision may have been partly motivated by Yoshida's desire to stem the increasing strength of the rival Hatoyama faction.
	The Prime Minister's action will frustrate the opposition's plan to use the current Diet session, which opened on 26 August, for a concentrated attack on Yoshida's policies. It also leaves the opposition parties with inadequate campaign preparations for the elections, now scheduled for 1 October.
	The election will be the first test of strength for the Liberal Party and for Yoshida's pro-American policies since the conclusion of the peace treaty and the security pact. Wartime leaders will also have an opportunity to regain Diet seats following their forced retirement from politics under SCAP directives.
5.	Tokyo believes Sino-Soviet talks may bring major conciliatory gesture
	According to Ambassador Murphy, there is a widespread belief in Tokyo that the present Moscow talks will result in a major conciliatory gesture toward the Japanese people.  This might take the form of a proposal for a peace treaty, a mutual nor aggression pact, a trade agreement, or a modus vivendi with the Japanese Government. Japanese Communists have hinted at such a possibility.

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Murphy believes it would be dangerous to underestimate the effect of such a gesture in neutralizing the American position in Japan, where there is strong sentiment against involvement in the East-West struggle. A joint Soviet-Chinese peace pro-

	rearmament program.	
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA	
6.	Egyptian Prime Minister outlines political program:	
	Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher has informed Ambassador Caffery that his program includes, in the following order, solving the country's internal problems, negotiating a	50X1
	Middle East defense plan, and reaching an agreement with Israel.	
	The Ambassador, commenting on the possibility of an accord with Israel, states that a previous Egyptian plan to negotiate with the Israelis several years ago was blocked when it was publicized in Tel Aviv.	
	Comment: Although the military regime in Cairo is pressing for domestic reforms, there is little indication that it wishes to complicate its internal problems at the present time by raising emotional issues, particularly the question of Israel.	
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	WESTERN EUROPE	
7.	Adenauer decides on earliest possible election date:	
	West German Chancellor Adenauer has decided to schedule the 1953 Bundestag election for June. This would be the earliest possible date, since by law the	50X1

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	election must be held between 7 June and 7 September.	50X1
	The Christian Democratic Union, Adenauer's party, reportedly feels that the present coalition parties will benefit from ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties. They also stand to gain from the fact that more votes would probably be cast in June than during the harvest.	
	In addition, it is argued that selective service legislation, which would have to be passed by the newly elected Bundestag, might be supported by the Socialists if the election showed public approval of rearmament.	`
	Comment: It still appears unlikely that the Socialists would support conscription, unless they were to agree to participate in a new government.	
8.	NATO plans threatened by limitations on US Air Force in France:	
	The NATO build-up will be seriously affected if the French Government persists in enforcing the present 21,000-man ceiling for the US Air Force in France, according to the American Embassy in Paris. The Foreign Ministry has just informed the Embassy that the government plans to maintain current restrictions until the United States Senate ratifies the French-American status-of-forces	50X1
	Since NATO plans call for 40,000 men of the US Air Force in France by spring, a Foreign Ministry representative has agreed to seek a relaxation of his government's stand. This change in position would be based on an exchange of notes with the United States designed to meet possible criticism in the National Assembly.	
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	Comment: While the French Government's concern over this matter seems based in part on domestic political considerations, its current evasiveness on the whole question of the air-base agreement suggests that it hopes to bargain wherever possible for additional American financial assistance.